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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
TIM THEMY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.
Case No. 15641
SEAGULL ENTERPRISES, INC.,
a Utah corporation, SHIRLEY
K. WATSON, UNITED BANK, A
Utah corpora ti on, ZIONS FIRST
NATIONAL BANK and MURRAY
BROADCASTING COMPANY, INC. ,
Defendants-Appellants.

Respondent's Brief

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the Summary Judgment granted by
the Honorable David B. Dee, Judge of the Third Judicial District
Court, Salt Lake County, Utah, and entered in the above entitled
action on November 2, 1977.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants Seagull Enterprises, Inc.
Shirley K. Watson
Inc·

("Seagull"),

("Watson") and Murray Broadcasting Company,

("Murray Broadcasting") have filed this appeal seeking

reversal of a Summary Judgment entered by the trial court.

It

is respondent's position that the lower court's decision should
be affirmed.

r

'
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Generally, appellants' Statement of Facts is accura
however, respondent believes that the Statement is over-long
and contains irrelevant information.

In determining whether

the trial court correctly ruled that respondent was entitled tc

summary judgment, it is sufficient to know the following facts:
1.

On June 26, 1974, the owner of the KMOR radio

station, O. J. Wilkinson, entered into an agreement for sale

o:

the station, including its FCC license, broadcasting equipment,
and several acres of land to Seagull.

The agreement was

evidenced by two written documents, each denominated as "Purd'
(See paragraphs 6 and 7 of Respondent's Amended

Agreement".

Complaint (R. 70-71) and the Answers of Watson and Murray
Broadcasting (R. 8 7) and of Seagull (R. 9 9) . )
were drafted by Seagull's attorneys.
2.

(R.

The agreements

327.)

Both Agreements, which obviously drew heavily

on the language of the standard Uniform Real Estate Contract,
provided for forfeiture in the event of buyer's default

(R.

1'

17) .

3.

Subsequent to payment of the initial downpayroe:

required under the two Agreements, Seagull made no further pa;'
under the contract (See Respondent's Amended Complaint' para·
graph 10 (R. 72) and the Answer of Seagull ( R. 99))

There is

no evidence that Seagull or any of its successors ever tender'
any further payments under the contract; and indeed, ther

-2-
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been no such payments.

In its memo in Support of Oral Argument

(R. 145-150) Seagull freely conceded that it was in default under
the Agreements.

4.

( R. 14 5, first paragraph.)

Because of Seagull's default under the Agreements,

on September 4, 1975, Wilkinson served notice upon Jay Gardner,
Seagull's process agent and Vice President, of his election as
seller to treat Seagull's interest in the license and the real
and personal property as having been forfeited.

(R. 309-310,

358-362.)

5.

On May 26, 1976, Wilkinson entered into an instal-

lment sale contract with respondent for sale of the real and
personal property and the license.

Wilkinson also assigned

respondent his interest in the two Purchase Agreements with
Seagull.

(Deposition of Tim Themy (R. 283), pp. 7, 8, and

Exhibits 1-4 attached thereto. )
6.

On March 8, 1977, Seagull sold the FCC license and

broadcasting equipment to Watson dba Murray Broadcasting Company
(R.

313-314, 363-365, 393.)

7.

Watson subsequently sold the license and equipment

to Murray Broadcasting under the terms of a "Proposal" dated
April 16, 1977.
8.

(R.

415-416.)

On September 2, 1977, respondent's counsel served a

letter upon Mr. Gardner which confirmed the fact that respondent,
as Wilkinson's assignee, intended to treat Seagull's default as a
forfeiture.

(R.

61 and unnumbered attachments filed with this

court June 2 9 , 19 7 8 . )
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9.

Based upon the foregoing facts and pursuant to

respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment the trial court enterec
its judgment in favor of respondent on October 2 5, 1977.
173-174.}

(R.

The Judgment provided that appellants' interest in

the real and personal property and in the FCC license had been
forfeited and that respondent was the owner thereof subject to
the security interest of O. J. Wilkinson.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE ARE NO DISPUTED MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT
Predictably, appellants argue that entry of summary
judgment against them was inappropriate because there existed
disputed issues of material fact.

The principal "disputed fac:'

relied upon by appellants are as follows:
A.

THE EVIDENCE IS UNDISPUTED THAT RESPONDENT IS TE
SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST TO THE SELLER UNDER THE
PURCHASE AGREEMENTS.

Appellants state that "respondent's standing as the
proper party plaintiff was a material fact as to which there wa
a genuine dispute between the parties".
by the deposition of Tim Themy (R. 283).

This assertion is bet:
(For reasons unknown·

the parties to this action, Mr. Themy' s deposition was sealed'
the time it was filed with this court.

However, by an order

dated August 10, 1978, the deposition was unsealed and publish'
An examination of Mr. Themy' s deposition shows the following:
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a)

By a Uniform Real Estate Contract dated May 26,

1976, respondent contracted to purchase the real and personal
property and the FCC license, all of which are the subject
matter of this lawsuit, from O. J. Wilkinson.

(Themy Deposition,

p. 7 and Exhibit 1.)
b)

By an Assignment of the same date Wilkinson

also assigned his interest in the Purchase Agreement for sale
of the broadcasting equipment and FCC license as well as his
interest in the license and personal property to respondent.
(Themy Deposition, p. 18 and Exhibit 2.)
c)

Subsequently, by Assignment dated July 6, 1977,

Mr. Wilkinson also assigned his interest in the Purchase
Agreement for sale of the real property to respondent.
~position,

(Themy

p. 20 and Exhibit 4.)

Since appellants have produced no evidence contradieting respondent's claim to be Wilkinson's successor, the
court's apparent recognition of this fact was correct.
The above facts were specifically cited in respondent's
Memorandum of Points and Authorities submitted below in support
of his Motion for Summary Judgment.

(R. 163, 1J 6.)

Appellants

at that time neither objected to respondents use of the Themy
deposition, nor attempted to place in issue the truthfulness of
the testimony contained therein.

Appellants may not now on

appeal for the first time raise the issue of the sufficiency of
the deposition.

This principal has been recognized by this court
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on several occasions.

See, for example, Meyer v. Deluke, 23~

2d 24, 457 P.2d 966, 969
314, 313 P.2d 465, 468,

(1969) and Radley v. Smith, 6 Utah 2d
(1957).

Quite apart from the Themy deposition, respondent's
interest in the Purchase Agreements was also demonstrated by
the Affidavit of Steven H. Gunn (R. 161) to which were attachf:
the Contract and Assignments found also in the Themy depositic:
Thus the court had ample evidence of respondent's interest.
Appellants also contend that prior to consummation
of the transaction between respondent and O. J. Wilkinson, Mr.
Wilkinson assigned his interest in the Purchase Agreement to
Zions First National Bank.

(See appellants' discussion of thi

point at pages 12 and 13 of their Brief.)

0

While no authority -

cited for this proposition, appellants apparently make referer.:
to an assignment dated August 3, 1976, wherein

o.

J. Wilkinson

assigned his interest in the Purchase Agreement relating to
real property to Zions First National Bank to secure payment
of a Trust Deed Note.

(Themy Deposition, Exhibit s.)

Since

the Assignment in question relates only to the Purchase Agreer:
as to the real property, but makes no reference to the compan:
Agreement for sale of the license, appellants are certainly
incorrect in asserting that the broadcasting equipment and tr.:
FCC license are in any way affected.

In any case, since the

Assignment is not absolute, but rather was given for the purp:
of securing payment of an obligation owed by Wilkinson to t~
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sank, it does not demonstrate that Wilkinson divested himself of
all interest in the Purchase Agreements prior to his Assignments
to respondent.
Appellants play a final novel variation on this same
theme when they contend that under the Agreement once the FCC
approved transfer of the license to Seagull, Wilkinson relinquished
all interest therein.

(See Appellants' Brief, pp. 14-15.)

Appellants cite no evidence in support of this proposition.
Indeed, they did not even bother to raise the issue below.

Thus,

their right to rely on this theory appears to have been waived.
Heyer v. Del uke, and Radley v. Smith, supra.
But even if this issue had been timely raised, it is
unsupported by any reasonable reading of the Purchase Agreements.
While the terms of the sale of the KMOR radio station
were contained in two separate Purchase Agreements, it is clear
that the sale was considered by the parties to be a single transaction.

Thus, for example, the two Agreements contain cross-

default provisions.

(See R. 11, ,I 10; R. 18, ,, 18.)

It is

similarly clear that the tangible assets of the station would be
of minimal value standing alone without the broadcasting license.

It is therefore ridiculous to contend, as appellants do, that the
seller's remedies under the Agreements were terminated upon
receipt of FCC approval of the transfer.

To accept this view is

to accept the proposition that the seller actually intended to
sen the station for the amount of the downpayment.
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Furthermore, appellants' theory is directly

contradk~

by the Agreements themselves which state:
In the event of a failure to comply with the terms
hereof by the Buyer or upon failure of Buyer to
make any payment or payments when the same shall
become due or within 90 days thereafter, the Seller,
at his option shall have the following alternative
remedies
(R. 10, 17.)
According to this provision the seller's remedies
may be exercised at any time subsequent to ninety days after
default.

But if appellants' interpretation were adopted, the

buyer would be without remedy as to a default in the license
Purchase Agreement once FCC approval had been obtained.

There

is nothing in the Agreements to indicate that this was the intr
of the parties.
B.

RESPONDENT PROPERLY INVOKED THE FORFEITURE
PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PURCHASE AGREEMENTS.

On September 1, 1977, respondent's counsel delivered
a notice of default to Jay Gardner, a vice president of Seagul
Enterprises, and station manager of the KRPQ radio station
operated by Murray Broadcasting.

The letter, which was addres'

to Seagull Enterprises, stated:
Because of some confusion which appears to exist
as to ownership of the seller's interest under
the Purchase Agreements dated June 26, 1974, and
as to the exercise of the seller's remedies under
these Agreements, we hereby give you notice of
the following:
First, our client, Tim Themy, has purchasedcr.e
the seller's interest under the contracts. Att~ r·
to this letter, you will find copies of the ass 10 '
ments to Mr. Themy.
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Second, Mr. Wilkinson, the original seller,
has already notified you of his election to treat
the default in payment as a forfeiture of Seagull's
interest in the real and personal property and in
the FCC license. You are hereby notified that Mr.
Themy has also elected to treat Seagull's default
as a forfeiture.
However, because of conflicting
information as to the alleged waiver of Mr. Wilkinson's
earlier notice, Mr. Themy has agreed to give you
five days from the day of this notice to remedy
the deficiency by bringing all payments current.
As of August 1, 1977, the balance due under both
contracts is $120,951.66. This notice is not
intended to waive any of our client's rights
under the earlier notice.
Third, we do not make demand upon you at
this time to vacate the real property. However,
your vacating of the property may be required at
such time in the future as will best protect
our client from loss of the FCC license. Mr.
Themy's failure at this time to reenter the
property is not intended as a waiver of his
right to exercise such right of reentry in
the future.
Finally, Mr. Themy hereby reconfirms the
earlier Notice of Default and Intent to Foreclose
which was served upon you. We still intend to
pursue this remedy in the event that the court
proves unwilling to enforce the seller's forfeiture remedy.
Sincerely,

/s/
(R. 161, as supplemented by the attachments subsequently filed

with this court on June 29, 1978, pursuant to court order.)
As indicated in the above letter, prior to service
of the above notice, on September 9, 1975, O. J. Wilkinson had

also served Notice of default and intent to seek forfeiture
uf Seayull's interests under the Purchase Agreements.

Copies

of these notices may be found at pages 358 and 361 of the
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Appellants contend that the earlier notices sent by
Wilkinson had no legal affect, because Wilkinson allegedly
sequently waived his forfeiture remedy.

"~

Whatever the trutho'.

such an allegation may be, it is clear that respondent, as
successor in interest to Wilkinson, by his letter of September
1, 1977, revoked any such waiver and re-invoked the forfeiture

remedy earlier relied upon by Wilkinson.
Furthermore, the notice of September 1, 1977, stand:
alone is legally sufficient to invoke the forfeiture
the Purchase Agreements.

reme~~

In pertinent part, the Agreements pr

as follows:
DEFAULT OF BUYER.
In the event of a failure
to comply with the terms hereof by the Buyer,
or upon failure of the Buyer to make any payment
or payments when the same shall become due, or
within 90 days or after, the Seller, at his
option shall have the following alternative
remedies:
A. Seller shall have the right upon failure
of the Buyer to remedy the default within five
days after written notice, to be released from
all obligations in law and in equity to convey
said property, and all payments which have been
made theretofore on this contract by the Buyer,
shall be forfeited to the Seller as liquidated
damages for the non-performance of the contra~t,
and the Buyer agrees that the Seller may at his.
option reenter and take possession of said prem~
without legal processes as in its first and fo~m~r ..
estate, together with all improvements and ':1d~1t 10 ··
made by the Buyer thereon, and the said add1t1on 5 •
and improvements shall remain with the land, becoro:
property of the Seller, the Buyer becoming at
once a tenant at will of the Seller .
(R. 10, 17.)

It should be noted that the above provision requir•
only the giving of "written notice" followed by a five d~'
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period for the remedying of the alleged breach.

No special re-

quirements concerning the writing are imposed by the Agreements.
Appellants contend that respondent's Notice was
deficient because 1) It was served subsequent to institution
of the proceedings below; 2) It was addressed to Seagull -- but
not to Watson and Murray Broadcasting; 3) It fails to indicate
that Seller was released from all obligations under the contracts;
4)

It fails to advise that the purchaser had become a tenant

at will; and 5)

It reconfirmed the fact that respondent intended

to treat the agreement as a mortgage and to foreclose thereon
in the event the court failed to grant forfeiture.

(Brief of

Appellants, p. 18.)
In considering these allegations, it is important
that the court understand that at no time in the proceedings
below did appellants ever challenge the legal sufficiency of
the notice of September 1, 1977.

(See, for example, the Memo-

randum of appellant Seagull in opposition to respondent's Motion
for Summary Judgment, R. 145-147 and the Memorandum of appellants
Watson and Murray Broadcasting in support of their Petition to
Reform the lower court's summary judgment, R. 176-178.)

Thus,

under the rule in Meyer v. Deluke, supra, this issue may not
now be raised for the first time on appeal.
In any case, appellants' arguments as to the sufficiency
of the Notice are clearly erroneous.

Respondent will consider

these allegations in the order presented in appellants' Brief.
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Timing of the Notice
Appellants contend that because the Notice was
served after commencement of this action, it was invalid.

No

authority has been presented for this dubious proposition.
Indeed, respondent knows of no such authority.

Since the Pfilc

Agreements require only the giving of notice, without refern:
to any legal action, respondent respectfully suggests that it<
notice fulfills the requirements of the contracts.
Lack of Service Upon Watson and Murray Broadcasting
Watson and Murray Broadcasting were not parties to
the Purchase Agreements.

Those contracts require only the gi

of written notice to the buyer (Seagull).

Under the contract

therefore, it was not necessary to notify any successor in
interest of the buyer.

Furthermore, since the Notice was se:

upon Jay Gardner, a manager employed by Murray Broadcasting,
the offices of Murray Broadcasting, it can hardly be said tt'
Murray Broadcasting and Mrs. Watson, the president of the co:
poration, were without notice of the receipt of respondent':
letter.

Indeed, neither Watson nor Murray Broadcasting has

alleged that it was without notice.
The Notice Contents
Appellants allege that the notice was insufficie'
,

(I

because it failed to inform them that by virtue of the inv
h.I

of the forfeiture remedy, they were tenants at will and ta
Seller under the Purchase Agreements was released from all
obligations thereunder.

Since the Agreements themselves ar
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silent as to the contents of the notice, it is difficult to
understand wherein appellants find such a requirement.

Respon-

dent has been unable to find any statute which relates to this
question.

In addition, in no opinion of this court of which

respondent is aware has it ever been required that the seller
give the type of information suggested by appellants.

On the

contrary, in Pacific Development Co. v. Stewart, 113 Utah 403,
195 P.2d 748 (1948) the court quoted with approval the language
of a notice given by a seller in invoking the forfeiture remedy
of a Uniform Real Estate Contract.

In pertinent part the letter

stated that the purchaser was in default in a specified sum and
that unless the buyer corrected the deficiency within the prescribed time "the seller elects to declare said contract forfeited
in accordance with the terms thereof."

Id. at 749.

Since

respondent's letter also gives notice of the default, lists the
amount of the delinquency, sets forth the time within which the
deficiency must be remedied, and states that respondent elects
the forfeiture remedy, it clearly meets the requirements of
Pacific Development Co. v. Stewart, supra.
Election of Remedies
The notice of September 1, 1977, makes reference to
the fact that respondent, if unsuccessful in obtaining forfeiture,
would seek foreclosure.
,I

Such a statement can hardly be said to

constitute an election of the foreclosure remedy.

On the contrary'

the notice makes it clear that the foreclosure remedy will only be
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resorted to if the court proves unwilling to enforce forfeiture,
For the above reasons appellants are clearly in error

when they state that a material issue of fact remains which coi.
have prevented the lower court from entering summary judgment,
POINT II
THE COURTS OF THIS STATE HAVE THE
POWER TO ADJUDICATE THIS CONTROVERSY
In points I and II of their Brief, appellants in vari:
contexts raise the question of whether the courts of this State
may adjudicate a controversy relating to the disposition of
FCC license.

~

This was also essentially the only issue raised

by appellants below.

(See Watson's and Murray Broadcasting's

Memorandum in Support of Petition (R. 176-178.).)

Rather than

replying to this issue in a disjointed fashion respondent will
treat it as a separate point in this Brief.
In considering this issue it must be understood that
disposition of an FCC license has really two facets.

First,

there is typically an agreement between the seller or assignor
of the license and the buyer/assignee.
the license is subject to FCC approval.

Second, any transfer c:
In objecting to the

ruling of the lower court, appellants choose to focus upon tr«
fact that any attempt to transfer the license in this case to
respondent or his nominee is subject to FCC approval.

Th~

point out, quite correctly, that no state court can order t~
FCC to approve such transfer.
v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 65

Thus, in Radio Station

s.

wo0

Ct. 1475, 89 L. Ed. 2092 (lq;

the Supreme Court held that a state court decision had excee;
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the jurisdiction of that court by requiring the parties to "do
all the things necessary to secure a return of the license".
l'L._ at 2101.

Nevertheless, the Court affirmed the trial court's

order that the physical facilities of the station be retransfered
to the lessor/plaintiff, because of fraud in the inducement in
the underlying contract.

In defining the powers of the state

court the Supreme Court stated:
We have no doubt of the power of the Nebraska
Court to adjudicate, and conclusively, the
claim of fraud in the transfer of the station
by the [plaintiff] to [defendant] and upon
finding fraud to direct a reconveyance of the
lease to the [plaintiff]. And this, even though
the property consists of license facilities and
the [plaintiff] chooses not to apply for retransfer of the radio license to it, or the
Commission, upon such application, refuses the
retransfer.
The result may well be the termination of the broadcasting station.
Id. at 2101.
Similarly·, in Regents of Georgia v. Carroll, 338
U.S. 586, 70 S. Ct. 370, 94 L. Ed. 363

(1949), the Supreme

Court affirmed the validity of a contract of purchase between
the licensee and the owner of the station, even though the FCC
had required the licensee to disaffirm the contract as a pre-

condition to renewal of the license.

In affirming the lower

court's decision the court stated:
The Commission may impose on an applicant
conditions which it must meet before it will
grant a license, but the imposition of the.
conditions cannot directly affect the appl1~
cant's responsibility to a third party dealing
with the applicant.
J_Ll_, at 374.
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The case of Stenger v. Stenger Broadcasting
tion , et al, 28 F. Supp. 407

Corp~

(M.D. Pa. 1939), contains a

c~~

statement as to the relationship between the courts and the
Federal Communications Commission concerning the disposition c·
a broadcasting license.

There the purchaser of the assets of

the station, including the license, had sought specific
formance of the contract of purchase in the state court.

pe~

The

purchaser also obtained an injunction preventing the license
holder from assigning the license to third parties.

In respor.:

the licensee brought an action in the Federal District Court

t:

require the purchaser to return management and control of the
station to him.

r:
f

f'

action.

The purchaser moved to dismiss the Federal

In ruling on this motion the court stated:
The fact that the subject of these contracts
is a radio station, which must be operated in
accordance with the terms of the [Federal
Communications] Act, is merely incidental. No
ground for Federal jurisdiction is alleged and
no Federal question is raised. This aspect of
the case is simply a matter of interpreting
and enforcing a contract, and this can be
accomplished through the equity proceedings
which are now pending in the [state court].

Id. at 408.
The rule which thus emerges from these decisions is
that in any transaction dealing with the sale or assignment~
an FCC license, the courts are free to determine the relative
rights of the parties including the "ownership" of the licen5'
However, the ultimate decision as to whether or not a license·
be transferred rests with the Federal communications commissi:

-16-
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Thus, one seeking to rescind, reform, invalidate, or specifically
enforce a contract for sale of an FCC license must obtain the
appropriate relief in the courts and then seek confirmation of
the relief by the Conunission.
the FCC itself.

This conclusion is supported by

In a letter dated May 14, 1976, over the signa-

ture of Wallace D. Johnson, Chief, Broadcast Bureau, Federal
Communications Conunission, the position of the Conunission was
summarized as follows:
[T]he Conunission has consistently held that it is
not the proper forum for the resolution of private
contractual disputes • • • "Thus as a long-standing
policy, the Conunission does not assume jurisdiction
in contractual or debtor-creditor controversies
involving broadcast licenses, recognizing that such
matters are generally private in nature and appropriately left to the local courts for resolution.
(R.

149.)
In the instant action, the court below in its summary

judgment of October 25, 1977, held as follows:
The interests of defendants Seagull Enterprises,
Inc., Shirley K. Watson, United Bank and of Murray
Broadcasting Company, Inc. in the FCC license
described in and arising out of the Purchase
Agreement for sale of the broadcasting equipment
and license dated June 26, 1974, are forfeited
by virtue of the default of the buyer thereunder.
Plaintiff is the owner of such interests subject
to the security interest of O. J. Wilkinson.
(R.

173.)
By its ruling the court attempted only to determine

the contractual rights of the parties under the Purchase Agreement.

The Court did not attempt in any way to require the
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Federal Communications Commission to approve transfer of the
license to plaintiff; nor did it attempt to require
to undertake such a transfer.

appella~s

The judgment entered below is

therefore clearly within the recognized powers of a court to
determine the rights or the parties to a contract relating to
an FCC license.

Radio Station WOW v. Johnson, Regents of

Georgia v. Carroll, supra.
POINT III
THE LOWER COURT'S JUDGMENT OF FORFEITURE IS IN HARMONY
WITH PRINCIPLES ESTABLISHED BY THIS COURT IN SIMILAR ACTIC
Point II of appellants' brief is devoted to the proposition that "the lower court erroneously forfeited appellant
interest in and to the prior payments made prior to the
Purchase Agreements . • . " {Appellants' Brief, p. 19.)
Appellants point to statements by this Court that forfeiture
provisions will not be enforced if they constitute a penalty,
and from this rule conclude that the lower court erred in
granting forfeiture in the instant case.
Appellants' argument appears to be based upon a
misapprehension of both the facts of this case and of the la\'.
A careful analysis of Utah Supreme Court decisions relating t:
forfeitures under installment sale contracts reveals that sue'
forfeitures have a dual impact.

Typically, the party to the

contract seeking forfeiture seeks not only a forfeiture of
the defaulting party's interest in the property described in
the contract, but also a forfeiture of all payments under the
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contract.

The issue of unconscionability raised in such

cases inevitably goes to the question of whether the seller will
be allowed to keep all or a portion of sums previously paid by
the buyer.

See, for example, Johnson v. Carman, 572 P.2d 371

(Utah 1977), and Fullmer v. Blood, 546 P.2d 606 (Utah 1976).
The issue of unconscionability may be raised by the
buyer in the form of a suit to recover sums previously paid
under the contract, Johnson v. Carman, supra, or as an affirmatively pleaded defense in an action brought by the seller.
Fullmer v. Blood, supra.

While this court on occasion has found

that forfeiture payments made by the buyer would be unconscionable
(Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 474, 243 P.2d 446 (1952)), respondent has found no Utah case where the court, having determined
that the forfeiture remedy was properly invoked, refused to
recognize forfeiture of the buyer's interest in the property.
Accordingly, there is no support in Utah law for appellants'
assertion that the alleged unconscionability should result in
a reversal of the trial court.
Notwithstanding appellants' assertion that the trial
court decreed forfeiture of the $79,000 downpayrnent paid by
appellants too. J. Wilkinson, an examination of the Summary
Judgment reveals that, the court did not address itself to this
question.

The Judgment simply states that appellants' interest

in the real and personal property and in the FCC license was
forfeited.

Thus, appellants' reliance on such cases as Perkins v.

~, supra,

is misplaced.

If appellants believe that they
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are entitled to return of their downpayment, they may bring an
action against Wilkinson.

But the issue of

unconscionabili~~:

no relevance in the instant case.
A further weakness in appellants' argument lies in U.:
fact that the issue of unconscionabili ty was not raised below-either in the context of appellants' pleadings or as an argumen:
in the proceedings relating to respondent's Motion for Summary
Judgment.

Thus, under the rule that a new theory may not be

raised for the first time upon appeal, appellants' argument mus:
be disregarded. Meyer v. Deluke, supra.
Finally, respondent wishes to point out to this court
that appellants at no time attempted by affidavit or otherwise
to demonstrate that forfeiture of its $79,000 downpayrnent wou!C
be unconscionable.

Indeed, in view of the fact that appellants

had use of the FCC license and had the possession and use of L
broadcasting equipment and real property from the date of the
Agreements (June 26, 1974), to the present, forfeiture of the
downpayment can hardly be said to be unconscionable.

POINT IV
THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT DOES NOT EXCEED THE RELIEF
PRAYED FOR IN RESPONDENT'S AMENDED COMPLAINT
Appellants state in Point III of their Brief that
the forfeiture of the FCC license declared by the court in iU
Summary Judgment was inconsistent with the relief prayed for i:
respondent's Amended Complaint.

Respondent confesses that he

is at a loss to understand the nature of appellants' objection
The relevant prayer in plaintiff's Amended Complaint states:
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Wherefore, plaintiff prays for a declaratory
injunction (sic) determining plaintiff to be
the equita~le owner of the license and equipment described above and further adjudging
defendants Seagull, Watson, United Bank and
Murray Broadcasting Company to be without
interest therein.
(R.

75.)
While it may perhaps be argued that reference in

the prayer to a "declaratory injunction" rather than to a
"declaratory judgment" may be somewhat misleading, prior reference
in paragraph 26 of the Amended Complaint to Utah's Declaratory
Judgment Act, sections 78-33-1, et seq., made it clear that
respondent sought a declaratory judgment concerning the rights
of the parties under the Purchase Agreements.
Similarly, it is clear that the court is empowered
under the Declaratory Judgment Act to grant the relief requested.
Section 2 of that Act states:
Any person interested under a . • • written
contract . • • may have determined any question
of construction or validity arising under the
instrument . . . and obtain a declaration of
rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.
Section 78-33-2, Utah Code Ann.

(1953).

Since respondent, by his Amended Complaint sought a
determination as to his rights and the rights of appellants under
the Purchase Agreements, and since the Summary Judgment made a
determination as to those rights, the court clearly acted
properly.

-21-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Appellants also see some significance in the fact
that in his Third Claim for Relief respondent prayed for the
issuance of a mandatory injunction requiring appellants to
assist respondent in obtaining transfer of the FCC license.
Appellants point out (probably correctly)

that such relief, •.

granted, would be in violation of the rule laid down by the
Supreme Court in Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson,

~tr.:

a court may not force an unsuccessful litigant to cooperate i:
divesting itself of its license.

However, since the lower

court did not grant the mandatory injunction prayed for, the
question is, at best, academic.
POINT V
THE LOWER COURT ACTED PROPERLY IN GRANTING RESPONDENT'S
MOTION FOR APPOINT?1ENT OF A RECEIVER
By an Order dated March 16, 1978, the lower comt
appointed a receiver of the real and personal property and o:
the broadcasting license.

The order empowered the receivert

take control of the station and to seek FCC approval for retransfer of the broadcasting license to respondent or his

no~

Appellants argue that the establishment of the receivership
exceeds the power of the court and intrudes upon the power
the Federal Communications Commission.

0
'

Neither of these

arguments is tenable.
Rule 66

(Receivers), Utah Rules of Civil Procedur:

states in pertinent part:
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(a)
Grounds for Appointment. A receiver may
be appointed by the court in which an action
is pending or has passed to judgment:

(3)
After judgment to carry the judgment into
effect.
(4)
After judgment, to dispose of the property
according to the judgment, or to preserve it
during the pendency of an appeal, or in proceedings in aid of execution when an execution
has been returned unsatisfied, or when the
judgment debtor refuses to apply his property
in satisfaction of the judgment.
Since the Summary Judgment of October 25, 1977,
forfeited appellants' interest in the property and license and
recognized respondent as the owner of that property and the
license, it is clear that the subsequent appointment of a
receiver for the benefit of respondent was simply intended to
carry the judgment into effect, and that the Order was therefore
within the authorization of Rule 66(a) (3).
Furthermore, inasmuch as appellants appealed from the
Summary Judgment, it is manifest that Rule 66(~) (4) permits the
appointment of a receiver during the pendency of their appeal.
Thus, the Rules of Civil Procedure clearly empowered the trial
court to establish a receivership in this case.
While not apparently denying this fact, appellants
argue that the receivership was unnecessary, since "respondent
in his own name and on his own behalf, may apply to the Commission
for retransfer of the subject broadcasting license without the
intervention of a third party receiver."

(Brief of Appellants,
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p. 26.)

Thus, appellants apparently would not object if

respondent were to seize the real and personal property and
broadcasting license, but object to a procedure whereby the
property and license is seized by a receiver for the benefit
of respondent.
As a practical matter, respondent wishes to inform
this court of his understanding that FCC rules require that an
involuntary transfer of a broadcasting license be accomplished
by means of the use of a receiver.

This procedure has receivec

tacit approval by at least one court.

In LaRose v. Federal

Communications Commission, 494 F.2d 1145 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia acknowle:
the propriety of the appointment of a receiver in bankruptcy
to take transfer of an FCC license and to sell it (subject to
FCC approval) to a third party.

The court does not appear to

have been concerned with the question of whether such an
involuntary transfer to a receiver was valid, but rather
addressed itself to the question of whether, having rejected
one potential buyer, the FCC was required to consider a second
application initiated by the receiver.

Nonetheless, the decis:

demonstrates the court's attitude of approval concerning the
involuntary transfer of an FCC license to a receiver.
·
h ip,
·
· t shoulQ
Apart from this benefit of a receivers
i
.
.
a 1 so b e pointed
out that if
appellants were to su dd en 1 Y abando:

the use of the license, a receiver would be clothed with t~
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power to resume operation of the station without immediate
danger of loss of the license.
But in the last analysis, whether or not an involuntary
transfer can be accomplished directly or only through a receiver
is irrelevant.

The FCC can surely make its own determination.

The only question with which this Court need be concerned is
whether under the Rules of Civil Procedure, the establishment
of a receivership was justified.

Since Rule 66, Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure, clearly provides a basis for the granting of
the receivership, any arguments as to the necessity of such a
receivership for the purpose of obtaining an involuntary transfer
are irrelevant.
CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding appellants' obfuscations it is clear
that the facts upon which the trial court granted respondent's
Summary Judgment remain undisputed.
a.

These facts are as follows:

There was a valid contract between the parties to

the Purchase Agreements.
b.

Plaintiff has succeeded to the interest of the

seller; appellants Watson and Murray Broadcasting to the interest
of the buyer.

c.

There was a default under the contract which was

never remedied.
d.

The contract provided for forfeiture in the event

of default.
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e.

Respondent properly invoked his right of for-

feiture.
Thus the lower court's Summary Judgment was appropriaBut there is an equitable aspect to this case which
respondent has not emphasized in replying to appellants' arguments.

Both appellants and respondent have contracted with

O. J. Wilkinson to purchase the radio station.

Appellants

have taken possession of the station and have operated it for
several years without making any payments under their contract.
They have not even offered to make such payments.

Instead,

they brazenly inform the courts of this state that they are
without power to punish or remedy the breach.
By contrast, respondent who has faithfully performed
his contract has nothing.

Respondent respectfully petitions

this Court to rectify this injustice by affirming the lower
court's judgment.
DATED this /$rday of August, 1978.

RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that two copies of

the foregoing '~

delivered to GARY A. FRANK, attorney for Appellants, by
·
depositing
a copy of the same in the U. S. Mails, postage
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prepaid thereon, this

/!!!aay

of August, 1978.
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